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No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster 
(WORK DRAFT (29Nov71) .. 
This appeal presents the question whether a Member of Congress may 
be prosecuted for ac~epting a bribe in exchange for a promisetoperform a 
~~~· > \ .. +\.JIZ. ' 
certain o££icialA.act unde~ 18 U.S. C. §,§ 201(c)(1), 20l(g). :Appellee, a former 
1 I I • ' 
. -
United States Senator, was charged in five counts of a ten-count indict-
I ,'1 
ment, with counts one, three, · five, and seven alleging that on four separate 
occasions, appellee, a member of the Senate Committee on Post O££ice and 
Civil Service, 
1) 
"directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, solicited, 
sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive 
[sums] •.• in return for being influenced in his 
performance of official acts in respect to his action, 
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which 
might at any time be pending before him in his 
The remaining five counts charged the alleged bribers with o££er-
ing and giving bribes in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 201(b). I 





official capacity ••• in violation of Secjions 20l(c)(l) 
and 2, Title 18, United States Code. 11 f. 
Count nine charged that appellee 
f./ 
"directly and indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted, 
solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to 
receive [a sum] •.. for and because of official acts per-
formed by him in respect to his action, vote and de-
cision on postage rate legislation which had been 
pending before him in his official capacity • . • in 
violation of Sections 20l(g) and 2, Title 18, United 
States Code. 11 2./ 
18 U.S. C. 20l(c)(l) (1970 ed.) provides "Whoever, being a public 
')fficial or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly 
corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or 
agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or 
entity, in return for: 
(1) being influenced in his performan~e of any official act ••• [shall 
be guilty o£ an offense]. 11 
18 U.S. C. §20l(a) defines "public official" to include "Member of 
Congress. 11 The same sub-section provides: "'official act' means any de-
cision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or con-
troversy, which may at any time be pending or which may by law be brought 
before any public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or 
profit." 18 U.S. C. § 2 (1970 ed.) is the aiding or abetting statute. 
'}../ 
18 U.S. C. 20l(g) (1970 ed.) provides: "Whoever, being a public of-
ficial, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, 
otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, 
directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, re-
ceives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of 
any official act performed or to be performed by him ••• [shall be guilty of 
an offense]. 11 
~ .. 
. ' -3-
Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of immunity 
under the Speech or Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution, 
which provides: 
"for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
[Senators or Representatives] shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place. 11 
After hearing argument, the District Court ruled from the bench: 
"Gentlemen, based on the facts of this case, 
it is admitted by the Government that the five counts 
of the indictment which charge Senator Brewster re-
late to the acceptance of bribes in connection with 
the performance of a legislative function by a Sena-
tor of the United States. 
"It is the opinion of this Court that the immunity 
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, 
particularly in view of the interpretation given that 
Clause by the Supreme Court in Johnson, shields Sena-
tor Brewster, constitutionally shields him from any 
prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative 
act . 
11I will, therefore, dismiss the odd counts of the 
indictment, 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, as they apply to Senator 
Brewster. 11 
\ 
No evidence had yet been introduced in this case. 
The United States sought a direct appeal to this Court, pursuant to 
4/ 
18 U.S . C. § 3731 (Supp. V 1970). We postponed consideration of juris-
diction. United States v. Brewster, 401 U . S . 935 ( 1971 ). 
4/ 
18 U.S . C. § 3731 has since been amended to eliminate the direct 
appeal provision on which the Un~ted States relies , 84 Stat . 1890. This 











The United States claims that this Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S. C. 
§ 3731 (Supp. V 1970) to reviewthe District Court's dismissal of the indictm.en~ 
against appellee. Specifically, the United States claims that the District Court : 
decision was either "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dis1nissing [an] 
indictment ••• or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based 
upon the invalidity or construction of the stat'l;Lte upon:which the indictment •. · : 
is founded" or' 'the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the 
defendant has not been put in jeopardy. 11 If the District Court decision is 
correctly characterized by either of those descriptions, this Court has · juris- . 
diction under the statute to hear the United States 1 appeal. 
In United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), we considered a direct 
appeal by the United States from the dismissal of an indictment that charged 
the appellee in that case with violating 18 U.S. C. § 1001, a general criminal 
provision punishing !raudulent statements made to any federal agency. The 
appellee, Knox, had been accused of willfully understating the number of 
employees accepting wagers on his behalf when he filed a form which persons 
engaged in the business of accepting wagers were required by law to file. The 
District Court dismissed the counts charging violations of § 1001 on the ground 
that the appellee could not be prosecuted for failure to answer the wagering 
form correctly since his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 





We found jurisdiction under § 3731 to hear the appeal in Knox, on the 
theory that the District Court had held invalid the statute on which the indict-
. - I 
ment rested. 396 U.S., at 79, n. 2. The Distl·ict Court in that case held 
that 11 § 1001, as applied to this class of cases., is constitutionally invalid. 11 
The counts of the indictment involved in the instant case were based 
on 18 U.S. C. § 201, a bribery statute. Section 201 applies to "public officials, 11 
and that term is defined to explicitly include Members of Congress as well 
as other employees and officers of the United States. Sections (c)(l) and (g) 
prohibit the accepting of a bri~e in return for being influenced in or perf orm-
ing an official act. The ruling of the District Court here was that all legis-
lative activity of a Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause from prosecution under § 201. Since that sectio!l applies only to 
bribery for the performance o'f official acts, the District Court 1 s ruling is 
tha~ as applied to Members of Cop.gress, ' § 201 is constitutionally in-
valid. We conclude that under Knox, this Court has jurisdiction to. hear the 
appeal. 
Appellee argues that the action of the District Court was not "a deci-
sion or judgment setting aside, or dismissing 11 the indictment, but was instead 
a summary judgment on the merits. The District Court, according to appellee, 
did not rule that § 201 could never be constitutionally applied to a C.ongress-
man, but that "based on the facts of this case" the statute could not be con-
. . 
stitutionally applied. Under United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), · 
. I 
' ' I 
I 
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an appeal does not lie from a decision that depends, not upon the sufficiency of 
I 
the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts. If the indictment is dismissed 
as a result of a stipulation or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the in-
dictment, which would constitute a defense on the merits at trial, no appeal is 
available. See United States v. Findley, 439 F. 2d 970 (1st Cir., 1971). Ap-
pellee claims that the District Court relied on facts outside the scope of the 
indictment. 
However, an examination of the record discloses that, with the except ion of 
a letter in which the United States briefly outlined its case against appellee, there 
· are no'·Ufacts" other than those recited in the ,indictment. Appellee, citing the 
language "based on the facts of this case'' used by the District Judge in an-
nouncing his decision, contends that the District Court must have relied on the 
government's revelation of the outlines of its case. We read the District 
Judge's reference to 11facts" in context as being related to facts charged and 
his ruling was that Members of Congress .are protected from prosecution for 
accepting bribes for the .performance o£ official,~, legislative, acts 
by virtue o£ the Speech or Debate Clause. Under that interpretation, there is 
no way in which § 201 may be applied to Congressmen who accept bribes. We 
conclude, therefore, that the District Court was not relying on any facts 
outside the indictment, and that his ruling was that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied to Congressmen. 
-7-
II 
On only one other occasion has the Court faced a direct conflict be-
tween the prosecution of an allegedly bribed Congressman and the Speech or 
Debate Clause. In United St ates v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), we review e d 
the conviction of a former Representative on seven counts of violating the federal 
conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S. C. § 281 ( 1964 ed.) and on one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S. C. § 371 (1964 ed.) There 
the Court of Appeals set aside the conviction on the conspiracy to defraud 
count, and Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, traced the history o£ 
Clause 
the Speech or Debat'e[o£ our Constitution from the Parliamentary privilege that 
culminated a long struggle l?etween the English Parliament and the Crown. Mr. 
Justice Harlan cited the oft-quoted passage of Mr .• Justice Lush in E x Parte Was o n, 
L. R. 4 Q. B. 573 (1869): 
"I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow 
it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or inten-
tions of member.s of .either House cannot be inquired 
into by_ crimira 1 proceedings with respect to anything 
they may do or say in the House." Id., at 577. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court concluded that the purpose of the privilege in our consti-
tutional scheme was to protect ·the independence and irtegrity of the legislature 
and to reinforce the separati.on of powers. Nearly a century ago, the Court 
held, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103· U.S. 1,68 (1881), that the privilege is to 
be read broadly to include anything 11generally done in a session of the House 




Having concluded in Johnson. that the privilege protected members 
£rom inquiry into the motivation o£ legislative acts, the Court focused on the 
specific facts o£ the Johnson prosecution. The conspiracy to defraud count alleged 
an agreement among Representative Johnson and his three codefendants to ob-
tain the dismissal of pending indictments against officials o£ Savings and Loan 
institutions. For these services, including the speech made in the House, 
Johnson was allegedly paid in the form of campaign contributions and legal 
fees. To prove that in making this speech Johnson was, as the government's 
attorney put it in his summation, doing "a day's work £or a day's pay, 11 383 
U.S., at 175, n. 6, the government at trial questioned Johnson extensively con-
cerning the authorship o£ the speech, the factual basis £or certain statements 
. .na de in the speech, and his motivation £or the speech. The Court held that 
this evidence, in connection with a broad conspiracy statute, was prohibited 
by the Speech or Debate Clause. The government was, therefore, precluded 
£rom prosecuting the ccnspiracy count, insofar as it depended on inquiries 
into his speeches, as being offensive to the · Speech or Debate privilege. 
The Court's actual holding in Johnson, however, was narrow: 
"We hold that a prosecution under a general crimir.a 1 
statute dependent on such inquiries necessarily contra-
venes the Speech or Debate Clause. We emphasize that 
our holding is limited to prosecutions involving circumstances 
such as those presented in the case before us. 11 383 U.S., 
at 84-85. 
The opinion thus specifically left open the question o£ a prosecu-
~ion, which though possibly entailing some reference to legislative acts or 
. ,-
motivations, is founded upon a 11narrowly drawn" statute passed by Congress 
in the exercise of its power to regulate its Members 1 conduct. Of mol4 e rele-. ' 
vance to this case, the Court in Johnson. emphasized that its decision did not 
touch a prosecution which, though founded on a criminal statute of general 
application, 11 does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant 
member of Congress or his motives for performing them. 11 383 U.S., at 185. 
The Court did not question the power of the United States to try Johnson on the : 
I 
conflict of interest counts, and authorized a new trial on the conspiracy count, 
2./ 
provided that a 11 references to the rna king o£ the speech were eliminated. 
Since Johnson , the Court has twice construed the Speech or Debate 
Clause. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), the Court indicated 
that legislators, in the sphere of their legislative activity, should be protected 
from the burden Qf defending themselves. The Court affirmed a summary 
judgment dismissing a civil suit against a Senator alleged to have engaged in 
a conspiracy to deny certain claimed civil rights in the course of a legislative , 
inquiry. See Powell v.McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
§./ 
The Court ruled.' with three members dissenting, that the conviction 
on the conflict of interest counts was. tainted by evidence of the speech, and 
therefore reversed for a new trial on all counts. On remand, the District 
Court dismissed the conspiracy CO\lnt, without objection from the government. ' 
Johnson was then found guilty on the remaining counts, and his conviction was 
affirmed. United States v. Johnson, 419 F. 2d 56 (4th Cir., 1969), cert. denied, 
397 u.s. 1010 (1970). 
. ~. ~. 
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The govermnent, then, may prosecute a Member of Congress under 
an appropriate statute provided that it does not rely on evidence of legislative ; 
acts or motivation for official conduct. If an indictment does not depend on 
such inadmissible evidence and if evidence of legislative acts or motivation 
is not introduced, the Speech or Debate Clause is not contravened regardless 
of whether the statute is narrowly drawn or of general application. 
III 
An examination of the indictment brought against appellee and the 
statutes on which it is founded reveals that no inquiry into legislative acts or 
motivations is necessary in order for the government to make out a prima 
facie case. Four of the five counts charge that appellee "corruptly asked, 
solicited, sought, accepted, received, and agreed to receive" money ''in re-
turn for being influenced ••• in respect to his action, vote, and decision on 
postage rate legislation, which might at any time be pending before him in his 
official capacity. 11 This is said to be a violation of 18 U.S. C. § 20l(c)(l), 
which provides that a Member who "corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, 
seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value ••• in re-
turn for ••• being influenced in his performance of any official act" is guilty ' 
of an offense. To prove a violation of this statute under this indictment, it is 
not; necessary to inquire into how appellee spoke, how he debated, or even how 
he voted. The illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to take money for a promise 
to vote in a certain way. There is no need for the govermnent to show that ap-




of the statute. The offense, in short, is taking the bribe, not the perforr.a-
ance of the illegal promise. 
Taking a bribe is, obviously, not pal·t of the functioning of the legisla- 1 
dIS no+ a. .... •-ff,t:.tf<\./tA.cfa-~ ,··h>nof.:... kJI5,.._..-hvc. &O...c,j-. 
1 
tive process~ l~h:e .... John.s.on b Co ~hal'-g.ed-wi.th ~-W'J 
/ . (j v;. IN'<--~ 
~a bribe..-t-~e.r vari~rv-i-c'e""sin~i.ng-u"S"eoJ''hi-6-influenc·ewith } .)} ·1 ~ -~--- ,,1\.s~~· 
- ..---
·th"~t~no~·hie'\te--S'Oni"eob-~&O\.l.g-ht-by-t'h'ftb'rib-e:r-:--i\1-o-reover, 
}).)!(, > J+ f"\1 G-tfd) wl"J.,C~ n\~ :>~t-~1~t"c J r.Jhe.:'/h.QA"" ___-]'"'-'J mv.--rl- I 
~the promise for which the bribe was given was(for the performance of a : 
"' . ? 'O:;~e.,S ·,t . . . ! 
legislative act, it-wo'l.ll:d-n~Amatter that the Member defaulteca on his illegal 
bargain? If, for example, there were undisputed evidence that a Mem.ber took 
a bribe in exchange for an agreement to vote for a bill and if thef e were al~ o 
the d l!Jc.·s l l11s ~ )f.:...rjks>... r~i~~ V'( 
undisputed evidende that he, in fact, voted against:,A ·bill, he~-a-s-noneth'?l-ess-
19{ (f.v.._ pt_Cf qy- ~rl-\o Vc;:. 1 f flo,. fhc:. lilO.t'CA of ~r'irfJAQJ"?J /1--u.. s:i::.=l u (< ...,~_ ... 
taken__e. bribe .a .. s-a-n1.att'er-of-fact-and-may-he-four.i.d-by-the-trie.~s-t.o...ha..v..e~ola t ed.-
L-u vz fj Y'C:..~i s~~lf 1 J,)- ·h trtAkc. a.. c::.rjl?!'- ? • 
the-st.ablte as a matter o£ ~w. Indeed, he offends the House and the public in-
terest less if he breaches his "contract 11 than if he performs it. 
Another count of the indictment against appellee alleges that he "asked, 1 
demanded, exacted, solicited, sought, accepted, received, and a greed to 
~I 
receive" money "for and because of official acts performed by him in re-
spect to his action, vote and decision on postage rat-.e legislation which had been 
pending before him in his official capacity. 11 This count is founded on 18 U.S. C. 
§ 20l(g), which provides that a Member of Congress who 11 asks, demands, exacts, 
solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for 
2./ 
We note that in this count, the indictment addresses itself a bribe 
:or "acts performed" whereas the other counts rna y be read as charging 






himself for or because of any official act performed or to be perfonned by 
him" is guilty of an offense. Although the indictment alleges actual perform-
ance of an official act for which a bribe is later given, it is once again un-
necessary to inquire into the act or its motivation. To sustain a conviction 
it -is necessary to show that appellee received or agreed to receive money 
' 
knowing that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act. In-
quiry into the act itself is not necessary; only appellee's knowledge of the 
alleged briber 1 s improper rea sons for offering and paying the money must 
be shown. 
Jndc.<:!.J 
The S_Reech or Debate Clause must be read broadly to effectuate its . 
~,. ,., f'P ''".~ cf ~-F~ I'J ,:, ~ p Y'Q "fc.c:;ho VI -fo oJ~"' /11 ~"-f'o .... Jl~i e~·c(.f s ~ ·F Jk lcjl~ J~~)v'<t 
rpUl'-p<>S:Ef..s, but its purposes were never to be a shield for taking bribes. If -f.....,~h:~ 
bribery is made a crime and if it is shown without an inquiry into how a Mem-
ber actually performed legislative acts or into his motives, it does not impinge 
on Speech or Debate immunity to hold that a Member can be held to answer 
c..-:; )')CC 1-f It" C. Y'"tt~Jt\""- ( ~c:-"t l•'l }\..«. S.c1v'~ 10.. V'l\~trtl\v("..-:..~ 
forA wh:=t"'other citizens or officials must answer. Members of Congress did 
I 
I 
not seek to usetheir Speech and Debate immunity to becorr.1.e super-citizens·k:, 
f'ro""' t~r.. f'-C'VI"' I Lie..s ~f brdJorv ... ., 1 t'f)o.t'v (f"l,~" -fr() "'1 ~""'~cld~s> ~v-iv,·l-\ 5 · 
The Speec'h or Debate Clause sought to protect legislative independence so ' 
that legislators could be responsive to their constituents rather than to an 
over-reaching Executive or Judiciary. A legislator who accepts illegal 
offers of money, however, is not res pond ing to his constituents nor is 
he performing an offic.ial or legislative act. We hold that Congress m,ay 





In reversing the District Court's ruling that a Member of Congress 
may not be constitutionally tried for a violation of the federal bribery statutes, 
we express no views on the question left open .:in Johnson as to the legitin'lacy 
' . 
of an inquiry into legislative acts or motivation if Congress specifically 
authorizes such in a narrowly drawn statute. Under this statute and this in-
dictment, no such inquiry is necessary to sustain a conviction. Should such 
an inquiry be made and should a conviction be sustained, then we might face 
the questions of whether this is a "narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress 
i 
in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of its members" 
and if inquiry into legislative acts and motivation is permissible under such ' 
a narrowly drawn statute. 
Nor do we face a case in which the defendant Member o£ Congress 
alleges that a prosecution, otherwise permissible under the Speech or Debate 
I 
Clause, is politically motivated and hence an interference with the separation 
of powers • . Such an issue will always be open for consideration when a proper 
case arises. We hold only that on this statute and this indictment, prosecution 
of appellee is not prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause. Accordingly the 
judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
~u:prtmt Qf!lud 4lf tlrt 'J!inittlt .itattg 
~aGlrtnghm. ~. <!f. 2llgt){.~ 
November 30, 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster 
~-~ 
~~ l>-tL 
..,.., e.-~ ~ .... (jl,A... 
~~ 
I enclose a first draft of my own view of a disposition 
of this appeal. 
It is an important case and a close question that falls 
within the express reservation John Harlan carefully carved out 
in Johnson. 
I do not propose action on this draft. Rather it is for 
information. It seems to me too important to dispose of with 
seven when we are likely weeks or even days from a full Court. 
To : ~~:.~~~--~~~ 
l as 
No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster 
(WORK DRAFT (29Nov71) 
J~r 
f·.J1r . "1 
H!'. J 
rr. J 
!' • J 
1\~r • " 
F l'O!L : , ... 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
an 
rt 
. 1 : 
T_his appeal presents the question whether a Member of Congress may 
be prosecuted for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promiseto perform a 
certain official act under 18 U.S. C. §§ 20l(c)(l), 20l(g). Appellee, a former 
]j 
United States Senator, was charged in five counts of a ten-count indict-
ment, with counts one, three, five, and seven alleging that on four separate -
occasions, appellee, a member of the Senate Committee on Post Office and 
Civil Service, 
]j 
"directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, solicited, 
sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive 
[sums] •.. in return for being influenced in his 
performance of official acts in respect to his action, 
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which 
might at any time be pending before him in his 
The remaining five counts charged the alleged bribers with offer-
ing and giving bribes in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 20l(b). 
-2-
official capacity .•• in violation of Secjions 20l(c)(l) 
and 2, Title 18, United States Code." ~ 
Count nine charged that appellee 
~I 
''directly and indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted, 
solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to 
receive [a sum] •.• for and because of official acts per-
formed by him in respect to his action, vote and de-
cision on postage rate legislation which had been 
pending before him in his official capacity • . . in 
violation of Sections 20l(g) and 2, Title 18, United 
States Code.'' 2/ 
18 U.S. C. 20l(c)(l) (1970 ed.) provides ''Whoever, being a public 
official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly 
corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or 
agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or 
entity, in return for: 
(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act .•. [shall 
be guilty of an offense].'' 
18 U.S. C. §20l(a) defines "public official'' to include ''Member of 
Congress." The same sub-section provides: "'official act' means any de-
cision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or con-
troversy, which may at any time be pending or which may by law be brought 
before any public officia 1, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or 
profit. " 18 U.S. C. § 2 ( 1970 ed. ) is the aiding or abetting statute. 
'i/ 
18 U.S. C. 2 01 (g) ( 1970 ed. ) provides: "Whoever, being a public of-
ficial, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, 
otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, 
directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, re-
ceives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of 
any official act performed or to be performed by him ..• [shall be guilty of 
an offense]." 
-3-
Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of immunity -
I) "' 
under the Speech or Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution, 
which provides: 
''for any Speech or Debate in either House, __tht;.J 
[Senators or Representatives] shall not be que_!L-
tioned in any other Place. " 
After hearing argument, the District Court ruled from the bench: 
"Gentlemen, based on the facts of this case, 
it is admitted by the Government that the five counts 
of the indictment which charge Senator Brewster ~ 
l_!te to the acceptance of brib_es in connection with 
th~performance of a legislative function by a Sena-
tor of the United States. 
"It is the opinion of this Court that the immunity 
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, 
particularly in view of the interpretation given that 
Clause by the Supreme Court in Johnson, shields Sena-
tor Brewster, constitutionally shields him from any 
prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative 
act. 
\ 
11 I wil~ therefore, dismiss the odd counts of the 
indictment, 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, as they apply to Senator 
Brewster." 
No evidence had yet been introduced in this case. 
The United States sought a direct appeal to this Court, pursuant to 
4/ 
18 U.S. C. § 3 731 (Supp. V 1970). We postponed consideration of juris-
diction. United States v. Brewster, 401 U.S. 935 (1971). 
4/ 
18 U.S. C. § 3731 has since been amended to eliminate the direct 
appeal provision on which the United States relies, 84 Stat. 1890. This 




The United States claims that this Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S. C. 
§ 3731 (Supp. V 1970) to review the District Court's dismissal of the indictment 
against appellee. Specifically, the United States claims that the District Court 
decision was either "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing [an] 
indictment ••. or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based 
upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment ... 
is founded" or' 'the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the 
defendant has not been put in jeopardy. 11 g;.p.e District Court decision is 
correctly characterized by either of those descriptions, this Court has juris-
di, under the statute to hear the United States' appeal. 
In United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 ( 1969), we considered a direct 
appeal by the United States from the dismissal of an indictment that charged 
the appellee in that case with violating 18 U.S. C. § 1001, a general criminal 
provision punishing fraudulent statements made to any federal agency. The 
appellee, Knox, had been accused of willfully understating the number of 
employees accepting wagers on his behalf when he filed a form which persons 
engaged in the business of accepting wagers were required by law to file. The 
District Court dismissed the counts charging violations of § 1001 on the ground 
that the appellee could not be prosecuted for failure to answer the wagering 
form correctly since his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
prevented prosecution for failure to file the form in any respect. 
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We found jurisdiction under § 3731 to hear the ?Lppeal in Knox, on the 
theory that the District Court had held invalicJ.. the statute on which the indict-
ment rested. 396 U.S., at 79, n. 2. The District Court in that case held 
that 11 § 1001, as applied to this class of cases, is constitutionally invalid." 
The counts of the indictment involved in the instant case were based 
on 18 U.S. C. § 201, a bribery statute. Section 201 applies to "public officials," 
and that term is defined to explicitly include Members of Congress as well' 
as other employees and officers of the United States. Sections (c)(l) and (g) 
prohibit the accepting of a bribe in return for being influenced in or perform-
ing an official act. The ruling of the District Court here was that all legis-
lative activity of a Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause from prosecution under § 201. Since that section applies only to 
bribery for the performance of official acts, the District Court 1 s ruling is 
tha~ as applied to Members of Congress, § 201 is constitutionally in--
valid. We conclude that under Knox, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. 
Appellee argues that the action of the District Court was not ''a deci-
sion or judgment setting aside, or dismissing' 1 the indictment, but was instead 
a summary judgment on the merits. The District Court, according to appellee, 
did not rule that § 201 could never be constitutionally applied to a Congress-
man, but that "based on the facts of this case" the statute could not be con-
stitutionally applied. Under United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), 
-
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an appeal does not lie from a decision that depends, not upon the sufficiency of 
the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts. If the indictment is dismissed 
as a result of a stipulation or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the in-
dictment, which would constitute a defense on the merits at trial, no appeal is 
available. See United States v. Findley, 439 F. Zd 970 (1st Cir., 1971). Ap-
pellee claims that the District Court relied on facts outside the scope of the 
indictment. 
However, an examination of the record discloses that, with the exception of 
a letter in which the United States briefly outlined its case against appellee, there 
are no ' 11facts 11 other than those recited in the indictment. Appellee, citing the 
language "based on the facts of this case" used by the District Judge in an-
nouncing his decision, contends that the District Court must have relied on the 
government's revelation of the outlines of its case. We read the District 
Judge's reference to "facts 11 in context as being related to facts charged and -
his ruling was that Members of Congress are protected from prosecution for 
accepting bribes for the performance of official, i.e., legislative, acts 
by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause. Under that interpretation, there is 
no way in which § 201 may be applied to Congressmen who accept bribes. We 
conclude, therefore, that the District Court was not relying on any facts 
outside the indictment, and that his ruling was that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as applied to Congressmen. 
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II 
On only one other occasion has the Court faced a direct conflict be-
l tween the prosecution of an allegedly bribed Congre s sman and the Speech or Debate Clause. In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), we reviewed 
the conviction of a former Representative on seven counts of violating the federal 
conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S. C. § 281 (1964 ed.) and on one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S. C. § 371 (1964 ed.) There 
the Court of Appeals set aside the conviction on the conspiracy to defraud 
count, and Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, traced the history of 
Clause 
the Speech or DebateJOf our Constitution from the Parliamentary privilege that 
culminated a long struggle between the English Parliament and the Crown. Mr. 
Justice Harlan cited the oft-quoted passage of Mr. Justice Lush in Ex Parte Wason, 
L. R. 4 Q. B. 573 (1869): 
"I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow 
it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or inten-
tions of members of either House cannot be inquired 
into by crimim 1 proceedings with respect to anything 
they may do or say in the House." Id., at 577. 
(Emphasis added) - -
The Court concluded that the purpose of the privilege in our consti-
tutional scheme was to protect the independence and irtegrity of the legislature 
and to reinforce the separation of powers. Nearly a century ago, the Court 
held, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 1.68 ( 1881), that the privilege is to 
be read broadly to include anything "generallY_ done in a session of the House -
by one of its members in relation to the business before it. 11 103 U.S., at 204. 
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Having concluded in Johnson that the privilege protected members 
from inquiry into the motivation of legislative acts, the Court focused on the 
specific facts of the Johnson prosecution. The conspiracy to defraud count alleged 
an agreement among Representative Johnson and his three codefendants to ob-
tain the dismissal of pending indictments against officials of Savings and Loan 
institutions. For these services, including the speech made in the House, 
Johnson was allegedly paid in the form of campaign contributions and legal 
fees. To prove that in making this speech Johnson was, as the government's 
attorney put it in his summation, doing "a day's work for a day's pay, 11 383 
U.S., at 175, n. 6, the government at trial questioned Johnson extensively con-
cerning the authorship of the speech, the factual basis for certain statements 
rna de in the speech, and his motivation for the speech. The Court held that 
this evidence, in connection with a broad conspiracy statute, was prohibited 
by the Speech or Debate Clause. The government was, therefore, precluded 
from prosecuting the ccnspiracy count, insofar as it depended on inquiries 
into his speeches, as being offensive to the Speech or Debate privilege. 
Court's actual holding in Johnson, however, was narrow: ---=c:::= 
'
1We hold that a prosecution under a general crimiml 
statute dependent on such inquiries necessarily contra-
venes the Speech or Debate Clause. We emphasize that 
our holding is limited to prosecutions involving circumstances 
such as those presented in the case before us. 11 383 U.S., 
at 84-85. 
The opinion thus specifically left open the question of a prosecu-
tion, which though possibly entailing some reference to legislative acts or 
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motivations, is founded upon a "narrowly drawn'' statute passed by Congress 
in the exercise of its power to regulate its Members 1 conduct. Of more rele-
vance to this case, the Court in Johnson emphasized that its decision did not 
touch a prosecution which, though founded on a criminal statute of general 
application, 11 does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant 
member of Congress or his motives for performing them. 11 383 U.S., at 185. 
The Court did not question the power of the United States to try Johnson on the 
conflict of interest counts, and authorized a new trial on the conspiracy count, 
~I 
provided that a 11 references to the making of the speech were eliminated. 
Since Johnson, the Court has twice construed the Speech or Debate 
Clause. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), the Court indicated 
that legislators, in the sphere of their legislative activity, should be protected 
from the burden of defending themselves. The Court affirmed a summary 
judgment dismissing a civil suit against a Senator alleged to have engaged in 
a conspiracy to deny certain claimed civil rights in the course of a 1egisla tive 
inquiry. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 ( 1969). 
~I 
The Court ruled, with three members dissenting, that the conviction 
on the conflict of interest counts was tainted by evidence of the speech, and 
therefore reversed for a new trial on all counts. On remand, the District 
Court dismissed the conspiracy count, without objection from the government. 
Johnson was then found guilty on the remaining counts, and his conviction was 
affirmed. United States v. Johnson, 419 F. Zd 56 (4th Cir., 1969), cert. denied, 
397 u.s. 1010 (1970). 
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The government, then, may prosecute a Member of Congress under 
an appropriate statute provided that it does not rely on evidence of legislative 
acts or motivation for official conduct. If an indictment does not depend on 
such inadmissible evidence and if evidence of legislative acts or motivation 
is not introduced, the Speech or Debate Clause is not contravened regardless 
of whether the statute is narrowly drawn or of general application. 
III 
An examination of the indictment brought against appellee and the 
statutes on which it is founded reveals that no inquiry into legislative acts or 
motivations is necessary in order for the government to make out a prima 
facie case. Four of the five counts charge that appellee "corruptly asked, 
solicited, sought, accepted, rec~ived, and agreed to receive 11 money "in re-
turn for being influenced ... in respect to his action, vote, and decision on 
postage rate legislation, which might at any time be pending before him in his 
official capacity. 11 This is said to be a violation of 18 U.S. C. § 20l(c)(l), 
which provides that a Member who 11 corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, 
seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value .•. in re-
turn for .•. being influenced in his performance of any official act 11 is guilty 
of an offense. To prove a violation of this statute under this indictment, it is ___, 
not necessary to inquire into how appellee spoke, how he debated, or even how 
he voted. The illegal conduct~ taking or agreeing to take money for a promise --
to vote in a certain way. There is no need for the government to show that ap-
pellee fulfilled the alleged illegal bargain; acceptance of the bribe is a violation 
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of the statute. The offense, in short, is taking the bribe, not the perform-
ance of the illegal promise. 
Taking a bribe is, obviously, not part of the functioning of the legisla-
tive process. In the Johnson case, a Member of Congress was charged with 
taking a bribe to render various services including use of his influence with 
the Executive Branch to achieve some objective sought by the briber. Moreover, 
even if the promise for which the bribe was given was for the performance of a 
legislative act, it would not matter that the Member defaulted on his illegal 
bargain. If, for example, there were undisputed evidence that a Member too 
a bribe in exchange for an agreement to vote for a bill and if there were also 
th~ 
undisputed evidence that he, in fact, voted against l bill, he has nonetheless 
taken a bribe as a matter of fact and may be found by the triers to have violated 
the statute as a matter of law. Indeed, he offends the House and the public in-
terest less if he breaches his "contract 11 than if he performs it. 
Another count of the indictment against appellee alleges that he "asked, 
demanded, exacted, solicited, sought, accepted, received, and a greed to 
§_/ 
receive" money "for and because of official acts performed by him in re-
spect to his action, vote and decision on postage rat•. e legislation which had been 
pending before him in his official capacity. 11 This count is founded on 18 U.S. C. 
§ 20l(g), which provides that a Member of Congress who 11 asks, demands, exacts, 
solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for 
We note that in this count, the indictment addresses itself a bribe 
for "acts performed 11 whereas the other counts may be read as cha r ging 
acceptance of a bribe for acts both performed and to be performed. 
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himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by 
him" is guilty of an offense. Although the indictment alleges actual perform-
ance of an official act for which a bribe is later given, it is once again un-
necessary to inquire into the act or its motivation. To sustain a conviction 
it is necessary to show that appellee received or agreed to receive money 
knowing that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act. In-
quiry into the act itself is not necessary; only appellee's knowledge of the 
alleged briber's improper rea sons for offering and paying the money must 
be shown. 
The Speech or Debate Clause must be read broadly to effectuate its 
purposes, but its purposes were never to be a shield for taking bribes. If 
bribery is made a crime and if it is shown without an inquiry into how a Mem-
ber actually performed legislative acts or into his motives, it does not impinge 
on Speech or Debate immunity to hold that a Member can be held to answer 
for what other citizens or officials must answer. Members of Congress did 
not seek to use their Speech and Debate immunity to become super-citizens. 
The Speech or Debate Clause sought to protect legislative independence so 
that legislators could be responsive to their constituents rather than to an 
over -reaching Executive or Judiciary. A legislator who accepts illegal 
offers of money, however, is not responding to his constitu:'ents nor is 
he performing an official or legislative act. We hold that Congress may 
enact legislation designed to punish the acceptance of bribes without contra-
vening the Speech or Debate Clause. 
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IV 
In reversing the District Court's ruling that a Member of Congress 
may not be constitutionally tried for a violation of the federal bribery statutes, 
we express no views on the question left open in Johnson as to the legitimacy 
of an inquiry into legislative acts or motivation if Congress specifically 
authorizes such in a narrowly drawn statute. Under this statute and this in-
dictment, no such inquiry is necessary to sustain a conviction. Should such 
an inquiry be made and should a conviction be sustained, then we might face 
the questions of whether this is a "narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress 
in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of its members 11 
and if inquiry into legislative acts and motivation is permissible under such 
a narrowly drawn statute. 
Nor do we face a case in which the defendant Member of Congress 
alleges that a prosecution, otherwise permissible under the Speech or Debate 
Clause, is politically motivated and hence an interference with the separation 
of powers. Such an issue will always be open for consideration when a proper 
case arises. We hold only that on this statute and this indictment, prosecution 
of appellee is not prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause. Accordingly the 
judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
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I would be willing to join an opinion written 
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JUSTICE W'M . J . BREN NAN. JR. 
Dear Chief: 
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~a•qmgtcn. ~. ~· 20,?J.I.~ 
Jam.ary 17, 1.972 
I have your memorandum suggestjng reargwnent in No. 70-5061, 
Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-26, Gooding v. Wilson and No. 70-45, 
United States v. Brewster. 
You indicate that you thought the votes in each of these cases was 
4 to 3. My record shows that Gooding v. Wilson was 5 to 2 to affirm. 
The votes to affirm were Thurgood, Byron, Potter, Bill Douglas and 
I. The votes to reverse were yours and Harry's. I've circulated a 
proposed opinion for the Court on that premise. 
My records do show that the votes in Kirby and Brewster were 
both 4 to 3. In Kirby I've circulated an opinion which Bill Douglas 
and Thurgood have joined. Byron has filed a separate opinion con-
curring in the judgment. 
In Brewster, my record indicates that Potter, Thurgood and 
Harry have joined your opinion and Bill Douglas has joined my 
dissent. Byron also voted to affirm. 
You'll remember that my view on reargument of 4 to 3 cases is 
that this is a matter for conference discussion. Certainly, as in the 
case of S & E Contractors, if at least four of seven vote reargument 
then there should be reargument. I would suppose someone would 
have to make the motion and then a vote be taken as we did Friday 
in S & E Contractors. In any event, I see no reason for rearguing 
Gooding v. Wilson if the five who voted to affirm remain of that 
view and join my proposed opinion. 
6_ '· ' • 
·~ !'"'"':--/ / . ~ / ·- - .• 
W. J. B. Jr. 
cc: The Conference 
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January 17, 1972 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
We have now set two cases for reargument and 
there are others that seem to me should be similarly 
treated. 
ment. 
The following are my "nominations 11 for rear gu-
No. 70-5061 --Kirby v. Illinois 
No. 70-26 --Gooding v. Wilson 
No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. · Brewster 
I previously indicated my willingness to have S. & E. 
Contractors v. U.S., and Lego v. Twomey reargued. The 
former is now scheduled for reargument and the latter has come 
down. There may be others, and generally I will vote to re-
argue any 4-3 case unless it is a "JMH pewee." 
To facilitate filing problems, I am sending individual 
memos on each o£ the above. 
Regards, 
~u.prnnt ~ ourt of tl1 t 'Pnitc~ ,!§itntes 
'Jlla.slpn~ttttt. p. ~· 2o~n;J 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS January 17, 1972 
Dear Chief: 
I vote against putting down 
for reargument the following cases: 
No. 70-26 
Uo. 70-45 
- Gooding v. Wilson 
- U. S. v. Brewster 
• 
No. 70-5061 - Kirby v. Illinois 
~ \;J 
\ ' \ .. · 
William 0. Douglas 
The Chief Justice 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 18, 1972 
Dear Chief: 
This is in response to your memorandum of 
January 17 concerning reargum.ents. 
I nominate for reargument the two abortion 
cases, No. 70-18, Roe v. WadE:.z and No. 70-40, Doe 
v. Bolton. It seems to me that the importance of the 
issues is such. that the cases merit full bench treatment. 
I think another candidate is No. 70-58, Fein v. 
Selective Service System. 
So far as your nominations are concerned, my 
reaction is that No. 70-45, United States v. Brewster, 
because o£ its fundamental importance and precedent, 
deserves reargument, and that No. 70-5061, Kirby v. 
Illinois, should also be reconsidered. Justice White's 
separate concurrence certainly so indicates. 
In s'lnnmary, I vote to set down for reargument 
Nos. 70-18 and 70-40, No. 70-45 and No. 70-5061. I 
shall abide by the Conference's reaction as to No. 70-58. 
Sincerely, 
;v.A. ---
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
indictment with accepting a bribe in returned for being influenced 
offictal acts 
in the performance of his ~H~ixxxXiVKXXEXK and with accepting 
a bribe because of official acts E performed.E~xNim He was 
indicted under 18 u.s.c. §201(c)(1) and (g) which specifically 
make members of Congress subject to the penalties for bribery. 
The other 5 counts of the indictment charged Cyrus T. Anderson, 
a lobbist for Speigel, Inc., with having offered Brewster the 
bribe in return for various votes on postage rate legislative. 
CONTROLLING CASES: U. S. v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); 
United Srates v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969). 
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Brewster moved to dismiss the counts of the indictment 
relating to him on the ground that he was sheilded from such 
a ~Nxx prosecution by the Speech or Debate Clause. No evidence 
was introduced. Instead, apparently because the indictment 
indicated that Brewster had accepted bribes in return for votes 
or promises to vote, Judge Hart dismissed the indictment ina 
a ruling from the bench. No formal opinion was written. The 
govt made a direct appeal under 18 u.s.c. (Supp. V) §3731 -----which permits such an appeal from a decision dismissing an 
indictment because of the invalidty or construction of the 
statute on which the indictment is founded and from a decision 
sustaining a motion in bar, when the def has not been put in 
R jeopardy. The Court postponed the jurisdictional question 
to the hearing of the mx merits. 
Since opinions have been circulated in this case, I shall 
not go into the arguments at length. None of the opinons 
argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this 
appeal. Brewster argues that the llliEXNREix decision kx below 
is a summary m judment on the merits, rather than a dismissal 
of the indictment. Such a summary judgment cannot be appealed 
under the Courts decision in U.S~. Sissmn, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), 
The argument that this is a summary judgment turns on a claim 
that the ruling below was not based on the constitutional 
invalidity of the statute per se, but was based on the invalidity 
under these facts. There is some language in the district court's 
remarks from the bench to support such an interpretation. 
But it is clear to me that the district court had not examined 
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the facts of the case to such an extent that his ruling could 
be properly called a summary judgment. The only facts before 
him were the indictment itself anJa letter from the govt 
alleged 
stipulating that all the HEKixixex activities XRXHKRN in the 
indictment were related to Brewster's legislative duties. 
Thus, Judge Hart's ruling was that the statute could not ge 1 
constitutionally applied ;: Brewster if the indictment related 
1 
.f to his legislative duties. Sa Since the statute it~f pxa 
~~ ~ ~nly makes bribes received in return for promises to perform 
~ "official acts" a crime, it is difficult to see MR}C how any 
~. indictment under that statute could be constitutionally applied 
~·~ a Congressman. In short, the xXXXMXRxix ruling was that 
~the statute was invalide, not as in SXxxiB SissQQ that the 
facts put in by the govt did not amount to a xix violation of 
the statute. 
Given that interpretation of the ruling of Judge Hart, 
it is clear that the opinion below is appealable as a dismissal __, ,..-., -of an indictment because of the invalidl.ity of the statute on 
which it was based. It is true that Judge Hart did not rule 
that the entire bribery statute was unconstitutional, as Brewster 
points out, but only that it was unconstitutional when applied 
to Congressmen, But in U.S. v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), the 
Court recognized, in a footnof~ tha~ direct appeal was permissible 
if the statute was rule~unconstitutional when applied to a 
' 
certain class of cases. Knox was indicted for mistatements 
in his tax forms, a law of broad applicability. The law was 
held by the district court to be unconstitutional when applied 
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to wagering tax forms because to require a gambler to fill 
out these forms violated his right against self-incrimination. 
But the law against mistating tax forms was not held to be 
unconstitutional when applied to everyone, just to the class 
of persons in which Knox fell. The Court neverteeless found 
jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal. k~~ Brewster's only 
refutation of Knox is a rather weak argument that the ruling 
was ill-considered because it was in fxxf~xixx a footnote. 
It seems to me that the rule makes sense. If instead of passing 
one statute making it a crime for all kinds of federal employees 
and officials to accept bribes, the Congress has passed a 
seperate statute for each class of employee, and if the district 
court had N2X~XXN2xsxxxNxe made the same substantive ruling it 
made here xkxxxaxt resulting in a declaration of the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute applying to Congressmen, there would be 
no question of this Court's jurisdictmon. The mere fact that 
Congress enacted one statute rather than an ineffic~ent dozen, 
should not alter the jurisdictional result. 
Alternatively, the govt argues that this appeal may be made 
because the ruling below was a plea in bar. No one knows precisely 
what a ~exx plea in bar is; Justices Stewart and Harlan have -
differed on its meaning in the past. After the briefs were 
filed in this case, the Court handed down its decision in u.s. 
v. Marion, No. 70-19, decided Dec. 20, 1971, in which it sustained 
a direct appeal from a plea in bar. It sxx~ said that a plea in 
bar was like 
"a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance, that is, 
where the defendantddoes not deny that he has committed 
the acts alleged an that tfie acts were a cr~me but 
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instead pleads that he cannot be prosecuted because of 
some extraneous factor, such as the tolling of the 
statutte of limitations or the denial of a speedy trial." 
Under that interpretation of a Exexx plea in bar, I do not 
think that ki the ruling below fits. Brewster did not admit ·- ....... 
the act but claim some extraneious factor intervened. Nor 
did he admit that the act of accepting a bribe by a Congressman 
is a bribe; he contends that it cannot be a crime. Therefore, 
I do not think this Court has jurisdiction under the plea in 
A A .. L-" bar rule. ~ ~ 
~--'-~.~ The merits of this case raise« the Speech or Debate  --Clause which the Court has only considered on five occasions. - -Only one of those opinions, U.S. v. Johnson, is directly relevant .. 
= to this appeal. Johnson was convicted after trial on 8 counts. 
Seven of those counts alleged that he had taken a bribe in 
return sf for using his influence with the Justice Dept x in 
an attempt to persuade the Dpet to drop various proceedings 
against Md savings and loan institut~. Those 7 counts were 
not challenged on appeal. Instead the appeal focused on the 
eighthcount which alleged that Johnson had been bribed to make 
a speech on the floor of the House in defense of Md savings and 
loan institutions. To prove this account, the govt focused 
on the content N£ of the speech and the motivation for it. 
The Court, speaking xksxa through Justice Harlan, reversed 
the conviction NRXXRXKXNRRXENN because of the method in which 
the govt proved this one count, and remanded for a new trial 
on all counts because the evidence from the one bad count 
»XX might have tainted the jury in ruling on the other 7. 
(The dissent focused only on the remand order; Justices Warren, 
Douglas, and ~rennan thought that the other 7 EN~ counts had 
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not been xxiRHK tainted and did not need to be retried. Justices 
Black and White did not participate.) 
The opinion determined that the primary purpose of the 
Speech or Debate Clause was to preserve the independence of the 
legislative branch from the power of the executive to bring 
prosecutions and of the judiciary to try them. It was in 
this connection, that the Court ruled that under a statute of ------ -general application, Congressmen could ~ not be prosecuted if -------the prosecution would x inquire into legislative XEKXl acts, i.e., 
things generally done or said in a legislature, or into the 
motivation for legislative acts. The Court, however, necessarily 
• 
interpreted legislative acts somewhat narrowly since it did 
not regard axe attempts to influence the executive branch on 
behalf of a constituent, an act commonly engaged in by Congressmen, 
as a legislative act. What if it did not permit was proof about 
Johnson's ~HHE speech to the House and his reasons for giving 
it. ~Ri~ Moreover, the Court left open a possible exception to 
its general rule in the case of a narrowly-drawn statute that 
delegation to the executive and judiciary 
would serve as a specificxixx/XNxk~xxxxxx~R ~f by Congress of 
its powere to discipline its members. 
It is on this last exception that the briefs in this case 
f~NE focus. I do not intend to deal with the argument at great 
length because it is irrelevant to the approach the Court took 
to this case in the opinions circulated ea~er this year. 
If the issue had to be reached, however, I would agree with 
Part II of Justice Brennan's opinion that the narrowly-drawn 
exception--which Harlan avoided ruling on rather than endorsed--
is prohibited by the S~~R Speech or Debate Clause. The govt's 
-7- arguments seem to me to ignore the inter-relationship 
between Artptie I, Section 5 which gives Congress the power 
to discipline its members and ArtRfle I. Section 6 which gxxex 
denies x anyone but Congress to question Congressmen about 
legislative acts. Taken together, I think those clauses mean 
that only Congress can discipline a member for a legislative 
act. I do not see how a majority of Congress could delegate -this power, which i~ after al) concerned with the independence 
and freedom of the mxRNXX minority, to another branch of the 
But as I said, I do not think that this issue 
I 
government. 
need b~ reached because the indictment is sustainable in KRXX 
another way. 
The Chief's opinion expresses the »xe view that it is 
possible under this indictment NX to bring a case against 
Brewster without ever inquiring into a legislative act or 
the motivation for a legislative act. All that need be shown 
is that Brewster made a promise XNX in return for money to 
perform a legislative act or that iRxxe he was ~xNi paid by 
his briber because the briber believed that Brewster had 
performed a legislative act in a certamn way. It is not 
necessary to prove that Brewster ever voted at all, much less 
which way xN and for what reason. Therefore, a narrow reading 
of Johnson would permit the indictment to be broughti in this 
case. 
I 
The dissenters would read Johnson more »xxNN broadly 
to hold that the Speech or Debate Clause covers anthing related 
to a legislative act. (Incidentally, this related to ~· 
wxw quoted by Justice Brennan XNXM from Johnson is, I . · , 
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taken out of context. See 383 u.s. at 172.) This is done 
primarily on the belief that to further limit the executive's 
power to bring prosecutions willx ~xsm±x promote legislative 
independence. But I xx suggest that that~ particular cat was 
let out of the bag by Johnson. xxxxk~x~sxxx~aNx~xsx~~x~x 
gaRgx2KSM«Rxfax ~cfs such as attempting to influence the 
Justice Dept are not legislative acts and may be subject to 
prosecution, than I suggest xkxxx that the ~sxxx executive's 
power to harass and intimidate legislators will not be increased 
by the Chief's reading of Johnson. Moreover, it is t clear to 
me that attempting to influence the executive branch would 
be reated to a legislative act, within the meaning Justice 
Brennan ascribes to that term, «~x~xx~xxk~xxxx~xxxsN But 
Johnson ruled such acts could be prosecuted. Finally, as a 
practical matter, it seems to me that the threat to legislative 
indpendence from potential bribers is at least as great as 
~
from a hostile executve or judiciary. 
~----------------------~-------~--That is a somewhat sketch/overview of the arguments 
advanced in the circulated opinions, but xx since you have 
those s~±NRNN opinions, there is little use for me to cover 
the same ground. I beleive that there is jurisdiction here 
and that the case should be reversed and remanded for trial 
to see if the govt can prove its case without introducing 
evidence of legislative acts or of motivation for legislative 
acts. If not, and if a conviction is sustained upon x evidences 
of legislative acts, than the Court can consider the narrowly-
drawn exception. 
REVERSE Fox 
"Random Thoughts" on No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster 
The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. 
Justice White assume that any inquiry into any bribe sought by or 
given to a Member of Congress by someone who hopes to influence 
him is an inquiry into the motivation for a "legislative act." They 
point out that in Johnson we held that such in inquiry into motiva-
tion was prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause. But in 
Johnson the government's proof was that Johnson had made a speech 
on the floor of the House in return for a bribe and it was pre-
cis ely this -- and only this --which led to a remand to see if the 
government could make out a case without showing some legislative 
act. Johnson was retried without evidence of the speech, convicted, 
and brought no appeal here. In Brewster's case, unlike Johnson, 
there is no need to prove that Senator Brewster engaged in any 
legislative act or that he intended to perform any legislative act 
for the bribe. All that the government need prove is that Senator 
Brewster solicited, received or was promised a bribe in return for 
some agreement, regardless of whether or not he performed any 
act in return. The dissents seem to suggest that if the subject 
of criminal inquiry might have motivated a legislative act, (had 
Brewster honorably (?) kep: his bargain!), the Speech or Debate 
Clause applies. I suggest that such a rule would actually require 
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a substantial inquiry into legislative motivation that is quite out of 
keeping with the Speech or Debate Clause. A bribe may motivate 
a Congressman to perform a legislative act or it may motivate him 
to assert his influence with members of the executive branch --
an activity which we specifically held, in Johnson, may be the basis 
for a prosecution. Under the dissenting views, an inquiry into 
whether or not a bribe could have possibly motivated a Member 
to perform any legislative act would be essential before the prosecu-
tion could be brought. Indeed, under such a rule, Johnson would 
have been able to say that the bribe he a:::cepted not only motivated 
him to attempt to influence the Justice Department but also motivated 
him to give a speech in Congress. Since that bribe motivated a 
legislative act as well as a non-legislative act on the same subject, 
the executive and judicial branches should not have been allowed to 
make it the subject of a prosecution. Yet, as long as there was no , 
direct inquiry into a legislative act or into whether the bribe did 
in fact motivate a legislative act, we held that the government could 
prosecute. 
In fact, the dissenting position assumed that Senator Brewster 
voted a certain way on postage legislation because he had been paid 
a bribe. Without such an assumption, his alleged acceptance of 
a bribe cannot be accurately characterized as legislative motivation. 
I would agree with the dissent that the Speech or Debate Clause 
would be contravened --leaving aside the possibility of a 
narrowly-drawn statute -- if the government attempted to prove that 
-3-
Senator Brewster performed a legislative act because he received 
a bribe. But if the prosecution proves only that he received the 
bribe, and shows no "speech or debate", or legislative act, we see , 
no constitutional barrier .to prosecution. The government does not 
call on a Congressman to answer for a legislative act simply by 
testimony that the bribe payer hoped or expected to get something 
for his money. Brewster could, if he wished, show he voted 
against the interests of the briber (or cast no vote) but this would 
be no more than evidence in the scales. 
Mr. J"ustice Brennan suggests that Johnson held that the stan-
dard of what is protected from executive or judicial inquiry by the 
. 
Speech or Debate Clause is whether the conduct looked into is 
"related to the due functioning of the legislative power. 11 He cites 
the Jchnson opinion, 383 U.S. at 172, for the quoted words. With 
all respect, the quoted words are taken out of context and do not 
fairly represent the holding of Johnson. The indictment in Johnson 
contained eight counts. Only one was challenged as in violation 
of the Speech or Debate Clause. The other seven counts, involving 
Johnson's attempts to influence the executive, were not attacked. 
In that context, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, wrote: 
No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be 
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause 
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to 
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise 
related to the due functioning of the legislative process. 
It is the application of this broad conspiracy statute to an 
improperly motivated speech that raises the constitutional 
problem with which we deal. (emphasis supplied) 
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Thus, the phrase "related to the due functioning of the legislative 
process'' was used in the negative to fence off those counts of the 
indictment not involved in the Court's opinion. Justice Harlan was 
not really saying that a conference by a Congressman with the 
Executive Branch was not part of the usual activity of a Congressman 
but merely distinguishing two different activities that were pre-
sented on that record. He had no occasion to treat a bribe taker 
who failed "to deliver. 11 
The Johnson Court did not imply the breadth of activities 
covered by the Clause which Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice 
White would find covered. The Court would be closing its eyes, to 
borrow Mr. Justice White's phrase, to "[t]he realities of the 
American political system" if it failed to acknowledge that attempts 
to influence other branches of the government are one of the activi-
ties in which Congressmen engage. Yet the Court specifically 
held in Johnson that inquiry into such activities was not prohibited 
and Johnson's conviction followed and was not reviewed. Surely 
the possibility of executive interference with legislative independence 
by the prosecution of legislators who attempt to influence other 
branches of the government in return for alleged bribes is no less 
than in a case of a prosecution for promising to perform a "legislative 
act" in return for bribes. There is no substantial increase in the 
power of the executive and judicial branches over the legislative 
branch resulting from holding that a bribe for a promise is not 
-5-
forbidden by the Constitution. If this is wrong, Members of Congress 
are outside the ambit of federal bribery laws for all purposes bribery 
laws are written. 
Finally, we should note that the specific danger to legislative 
independence that Mr. Justce White perceives in holding a Congress-
man for bribery may, on second glance, prove less than threaten-
ing. He is concerned that Congressmen may be inhibited in doing 
legislative favors for constituents who have made substantial cam-
paign contributions. But one man 1 s inhibition is another 1 s circum-
spection. (People do not bribe Members of Congress to shoot one 
another, but for other things.) It should be recalled that legislative 
independence, the admitted policy behind the Speech or Debate Clause, 
may be threatened far more by corrupt use of financial rewards as 
well as by executive or judicial coercion. Indeed, examples of the 
former are numerous and examples of the latter are hard to find. 
The wrath of voters is a large deterrent to groundless prosecutions 
of legislators. 
The dissents engage in what you have called on various occasions 
the process of carrying a sound idea beyond the outer limits of its 
logic. It simply cannot be that the Speech or Debate Clause was 
intended to cloak Members of Congress with an absolute immunity 
for conduct that could lead to the criminal conviction of members of 
the Executive branch or of the Judiciary or of the persons who pay 
bribes. The Constitution was not conceived in corruption 
-6-
and independence of legislators does not call for a kind of pro-
tection not extended to cabinet officers, judges and other mortals. 
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[May -, 1972] 
MR. CHIEF J-csTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
This direct appeal from the District Court presents 
the question whether a Member of Congress may be 
prosecuted under 18 U. S. C. ~§ 201 (c) (1) , 201 (g), 
for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promise relat-
ing to an official act. Appellee, a former United States 
Senator, was charged with five counts of a. 10-count 
indictment.1 Co.unts one, three, five, and seven alleged 
that on four separate occasions. appellee, ·while he was 
a Senator and a. member of the Senate Committee on 
Post Office and Civil Service, 
"directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, solicited, 
sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive 
[sums] ... in return for being influenced in his 
performance of official acts in respect to his action, 
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which 
might at any time be pending before him in his 
official capacity . . . in violation of Sections 201 
(c)(1) and 2, Title 18, United States Code." 2 
1 The remaining five counts charged the alleged bribers with offer-
ing and giving bribes in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 201 (b) . 
2 18 U. S. C. § 2019 (c) (1) provides "Whoe\·er, being a public 
official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly 
corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, 
__ .....__ ..... ~_ 
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Count nine charged that appellee 
"directly and indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted, 
solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to 
receive [a sum] ... for and because of official 
acts performed by him in respect to his action. 
vote and decision on postage rate legislation which 
had been pending before him in his officia.l capac-
ity ... in violation of Sections 201 (g) a.nd 2, Title 
18, United States Code." 3 
Before a trial date was set, the appellee moved to 
dismiss the indictment ou the ground of immunity under 
the Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, of the Consti-
tution, which provides: 
"for any Speech or Debate in either House, thPy 
[Senators or Representatives l shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place." 
After hearing argument. the District Court ruled from 
the bench: 
"Gentlemen, based on the facts of this case, 
it is admitted by the Government that thf' fi \'e 
or agree,; to recei1·e anything of value for himself or for any other 
per~on or entity, in rrturn for: 
"(1) being influenced in his performance of :my offiria.l act .. _ 
[ ~hall be guilty of an offense]." 
18 U. S. C. § 201 (a) dcfinrs "publir ofT-icial" to include "Mrmber 
of Congress." The same sub~rclion provides: "'official :tel' mrans 
any derision or action on :my quest ion , matter, cause, snit, proceeding 
or contro1·ersy, which may nt any tinw br pending or which may by 
law be brought bdore any public official, in his ofT-irial capacity, or 
in his pla.re of tru. L or profit." 18 U. S. C. § 2 is the aiding 
or abetting statute. 
3 18 U. S. C. § 201 (g) pro1·icles: ''Whocn~r, being a publir of-
ficial, former public official, or J1C'r~on selected to be n public offirial, 
otherwise than as pro1·iclecl by Llw for the proper discharp;c of 
ofT-icial duty, directly or indirectly askR, dcmandR, exact~, solicit s, 
serks, accepts, recciYes, or r~grcrs to recei1·e anything of value for 
himself for or because •)f any official act performed or to be per-
formed by him ... [shall be guilty of an offense]." 
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counts of the indictmcn t which charge Senator 
Brewster relate to the acceptance of bribes in con-
nection with the performance of a legislative func-
tion by a Senator of the United States. 
"It is the opinion of this Court that. the immunity 
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Con-
stitution, particularly in view of t.he interpretation 
given that Clause by the Supreme Court in John-
son, shields Senator Bre,vster, constitutionally 
shields him from any prosecution for alleged bribery 
to perform a legislative act. 
"I will, therefore, dismiss the odd counts of the 
indictment, 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, as they apply to Sen-
ator Brewster." 
The United States filed a direct appeal to this 
Court, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. ~ 3731 (Supp. V, 1970) .~ 
We postponed consideration of jurisdiction until hear-
ing the case on the merits. 401 U. S. 935 (1971). 
I 
The United States asserts that this Court has juris-
diction under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (Supp. V. 1970) to 
review the District Court's dismissal of the indictment 
4 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (Supp. V, 1970) proYidrs: 
"An appeal may be takrn by nne! on behalf of the United States 
from the district courts direct to the Snpremr Court of the United 
States in nil criminal cas('~ in the following instances: 
"From a decision or judgment setting asidr, or dismissing any in-
dictment or information, or any count" thrreof, where such decisions 
or judgment is based upon the invalidity or conRI ruction of the stat-
ute upon which the indictment or information is founded. 
"From the drcision or judgment suRt:-~ining a motion in bar, when 
the defendant hns not been put in jcop:-~rcly." 
The statute has since brcn amended to eliminate the direct ap-
peal provision on which the United Stntes relics. 84 Stat. 1890 
(Jan. 2, 1971). This appeal, however, was perfected under the old 
statute. 
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against appellee. Specifically, the United States urges 
tha.t District Court decision >vas either "a decision or 
judgment setting aside, or dismissing ran l indictment ... 
or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment 
is based upon the invalidity or construction of the 
statute upon which the indictment ... is founded" or 
a "decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, 
'when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy."· 
If the District Court decision is correctly characterized 
by either of those descriptions, this Court has jurisdic-
tion under tho statute to hear the United States' appeal. 
In United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 ( Hl69), we 
considered a direct appeal by the United States from 
the dismissal of an indictment that charged the appellee 
in that case with violating 18 U. S. C. § 1001, a general 
criminal provision punishing fraudulent statements made 
to any federal agency. The appellee, Knox, had been 
accused of willfully understating the number of em-
ployees accepting v,·agcrs on his behalf when he filed 
a form which persons engaged in the business of accept-
ing wagers were required by law to file. The District 
Court dismissed the counts charging violations of § 1001 
'on the ground that the appellee could not be prosecuted 
· for failure to answer the wagering form correctly since 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion prevented prosecution for failure- to file the form 
in any respect. We found jurisdiction under § 3731 
to hear the appeal in Knox on the theory that the 
District Court had passed on the validity of the statute· 
on which the indictment rested. 396 U. S., at 79 n. 2. 
The District Court in that case held that "~ 1001, as 
applied to this class of cases, is constitutionally invalid." 
The counts of the indictment involved in the instant 
case were based on 18 U. S. C. § 201, a bribery statute. 
Section 201 applies to "public officials," and that term 
is defined explicitly to include Members of Congress 
as well as other employees and officers of the United 
70--45-0PINION 
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States. Subsections (c) (1) and (g) prohibit the ac-
cepting of a bribe in return for being influenced in or-
performing an official act. The ruling of the District 
Court here was that "the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Constitution, particularly in view of the interpre-
tation given ... in Johnson shields Senator Brewster ... 
from any prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a 
legislative act." Since § 201 applies only to bribery for 
the performance of official acts, the District Court's 
ruling is that, as applied to Members of Congress, § 201 
is constitutionally invalid. 
Appellee argues that the action of the District Court 
was not "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dis-
missing" the indictment, but was instead a summary 
judgment on the merits. Appellee also argues that the 
District Court did not rule that § 201 could never be 
constitutionally applied to a Congressman, but that 
"based on the facts of this case" the statute could not 
be constitutionally applied. Under United States v. 
Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 ( 1970), an appeal does not lie 
from a decision that rests, not upon the sufficiency of 
the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts. If 
·an indictment is dismissed as a result of a stipulated 
fact or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the 
indictment, which facts would constitute a defense on 
the merits at trial, no appeal is available. See United 
States v. Findley, 439 F. 2c1 970 (CAl 1971). Appellee 
claims that the District Court relied on factual matter 
other than facts alleged in the indictment. 
An examination of the record, however, discloses that,. 
with the exception of a letter in which the United States 
briefly outlined the theory of its case against appellee, 
there were no "facts" on which the District Court could 
act other than those recited in the indictment. Appellee, 
contends that the statement "based on the facts of this 
case," used by the District Judge in announcing his 
decision, shows reliance on the Government's outline· 
70--45-0PINION 
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of its case. We read the District Judge's reference to 
"facts," in context, as a reference to the facts alleged 
in the indictment and his ruling as holding that Mem-
bers of Congress arc totally immune from prosecution 
for accepting bribes for the performance of official, i e., 
legislative, acts by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Under that interpretation of § 201, it cannot be applied 
to a Member of Congress who accepts bribes that relate 
in any way to his office. We conclude, therefore, that 
the District Court was relying only on facts alleged 
in the indictment and that the dismissal of the indict-
ment was based on a determination that the statute 
on which the indictment was drawn was invalid under 
the Speech or Debate Clause. As a consequence, this 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
II 
The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were 
not written into the Constitution simply for the per-
sonal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but 
to pwtect the integrity of the legislative process by 
insuring the independence of individual legislators. The 
genesis of the Clause at common law is well known. 
'In his opinion for the Court. in United Stales v. Johnson, 
383 U. S. 169 (1969), Mr. Justice Harlan canvassed 
the history of the Clause and concluded that it 
"was the culmination of a long struggle for 
parliamentary supremacy. Behind these simple 
phrases lies a history of conflict bet\\'een the Com-
mons and the Tudor and Stuart monarchs during 
which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and 
civil law to suppress and intimidate critical legisla-
tors. Since the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and 
throughout United States history, the privilege has 
been recognized as an important protection of the 
70-45-0PIKION 
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independence and integrity of the legislature." I d., 
at 178. (Footnote omitted.) 
Although the Speech or Debate Clause's historic roots 
are in English history, it must be interpreted in light of 
the American experience and in the context of the 
American constitutional scheme of government rather 
than the English parliamentary system. The English 
system of government differs from ours in that their 
Parliament is the supreme authority, and not a co-
ordinate branch. Our speech or debate privilege was 
designed to preserve legislative independence, not su-
premacy." Our task, therefore, is to apply the Clauso 
in such a way as to insure the independence of the 
legislature " ·ithout elevating it in stature above the 
other two co-equal branches of Government. 
It docs not undermine the validity of the Framers' 
concern for the independence of the legislative branch 
to acknowledge that our system of Government has never 
produced the sort of executive abuses that gave rise to 
the privilege. There is nothing in our history, for ex-
ample, comparable to the imprisonment of a Member 
of Parliament in the Tower without a hearing and, 
owing to the subservience of some royal judges to 
the Seventeenth a.nd Eighteenth Century English 
Kings, without meaningful recourse to a writ of habeas 
5 Celln, Thr Doctrine of LegiHiati,·e Pri,·ilrgc of Freedom of Speech 
and Debate: Hs Pniit, Presrnt and Future aii a Bar to Criminal 
Prosrrutions in thr Court3, 2 Suffolk L. ReY. 1, 15 (1968), Note, The 
Bribrd Congre~sman's Immunity from Proserulion, 75 Yale L. J . 
335,337-338 (1965) . 
In Austrnlia and Cana(h, "where provision for legislati,·e free 
sprcch or drbalc exists but wherr the lrgi~lnture may not claim a 
tradition as tho highrst rourt of the rralm, courts have hold the 
priYiloge does not bar the criminal prosecution of lrgislator::1 for 
bribery." !d., at 338. 
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corpus.6 In fact, on only one previous occasion has 
this Court ever interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause 
in the context of a criminal charge against a Membe1· 
of Congress. 
(a) In United States v. Johnson, supra, the Court re-
viewed the conviction of a former Representative on 
seven counts of violating the federal conflict of interest 
statute, 18 U . S. C. § 281, and on one count of con-
spiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U . S. C. § 371. 
The Court of Appeals had set aside the conviction on 
the count for conspiracy to defraud as violating the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Mr. Justice Harlan, speak-
ing for the Court, cited. the oft-quoted passage of Mr. 
Justice Lush in Ex Parte Wason, 4 Q. B. 573 (1869): 
"I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to 
allow it to be doubted for a moment that the mo-
tives or intentions of members of either House can-
not be inquired into by criminal proceedings with 
respect to anything they may do or say in the 
House." Id., at 577 (emphasis added). 
In Kilbourn Y. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881), the 
first case in which this Court interpreted the Speech 
or Debat-e Clause, we adopted a similar statement of 
the ambit of the American privilege. There the Court 
said the Clause is to be read broadly to include any-
thing "generally done in a session of the House by one 
of its members in relation to the business before it." 
103 U. S., at 204. This statement, too, was cited with 
approval in Johnson, 383 U. S., at 179. Our conclu-
sion in Johnson was that the privilege protected mem-
bers from inquiry into legislative acts or the motivation 
for actual performance of legislative acts. Id., at 185. 
0 See C. Wittke, Tho History of English Parliamentary Privilege, 
23-32 (1921) 0 
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In applying the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court 
focused on the specific facts of the Johnson prosecu-
tion. The conspiracy to defraud count alleged an 
agreement among Representative Johnson and three co-
defendants to obtain the dismissal of pending indict-
ments against officials of savings and loan institutions. 
For these services, which included a speech made by 
Johnson on the House floor, Johnson was paid money 
which the Government claimed was a bribe. At trial, 
the Government questioned Johnson extensively relative 
to the conspiracy to defraud count concerning the au-
thorship of the speech, the factual basis for certain 
statements made in the speech, and his m.otives for giving· 
the speech. The Court held that the use of evidence 
of a speech to support a count under a broad con-
spiracy statute was prohibited by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. The Government was, therefore, precluded from 
prosecuting the conspiracy count on retrial, insofar as 
it depended on inquiries into speeches made in the House. 
It is important to note the very narrow scope of the 
Court's holding in Johnson: 
"We hold that a prosecution under a general crim-
inal statute dependent on such inquiries necessarily 
contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause. We em-
phasize that our holding is limited to prosecutions 
involving circumstances such as those presented in 
the case before us." 383 U. S., at 184-185. 
The opinion specifically left open the question of a 
prosecution, which though possibly entailing some ref-
erence to legislative acts, is founded upon a "narrowly 
drawn" statute passed by Congress in the exercise of 
its power to regulate its Member's conduct. Of more 
relevance to this case, the Court in Johnson emphasized 
that its decision did not affect a prosecution which, 
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though founded on a criminal statute of general appli-
cation, "does not draw in question the legislative acts 
of the defendant member of Congress or his motives 
for performing them." !d., at 185. The Court did not 
question t.he power of the United States to try Johnson 
on the conflict of interest counts, and it authorized a 
new trial on the conspiracy count, provided that all ref-
erences to the making of the speech were eliminated.7 
Chief Justice Warren, joined by JL"S'l'ICES Dm.:GLAS 
and BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part 
stated: 
"After reading the record, it is my conclusion 
that the Court of Appeals erred in determining 
that the evidence concerning the speech infected 
the jury's judgment on the [conflict of interest] 
counts. The evidence amply supports the prosecu-
tion's throry and the jury's verdict on these counts-
that the respondent received over $20,000 for at-
tempting to have the Justice Department dismiss 
an indictment against his [present] co-conspirators, 
without disclosing his role in the enterprise. This 
is the classic example of a violation of ~ 281 b.v a 
Member of the Congress. Rec lVf.ay v. United Stoll's, 
175 F. 2d 994, 1006 (C.A.D.C. C'ir.); United States 
Y. Booth, 148 F. 112, 117 (C'ir. Ct. D. Ore.). The 
arguments of government couns('l and the court's 
instructions separating the conspiracy from the sub-
stantive counts seem unimpeachable. The speech 
was a minor pm:t of the prosecution. There ·was 
nothing in it to inflame the jury and the rrspond-
7 On remand, the Di~trirt Court dimliR~cd the ron~piracy count 
without objection from the Gon•rnmrnt. Jolm~on was then found 
guilty on the rcmnining rount~ . and his rom·ietion was nflirmcd. 
United Sta.tes v. Johnson, 419 F. 2d 5G (CA4 1969) , <'Crt. denied, 
397 U.S. 1010 (1970). 
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ent pointed with pride to it as evidence of his 
vigilance in protecting the finaucial institutions of 
his State. The record further reveals that the 
trial participants were well aware that a findiug 
of criminality 011 one count did not authorize sim-
ilar conclusions as to other counts, and I believe 
that this salutary principle \\"aS conscientiously fol-
lo\\·cd. Therefore, I would affirm the conviction 
on the substantive counts." [Footnote omitted.] 
Johnson thus stands as a unanimous holding that a 
Member of Congress may be prosecuted under a crim-
inal statute provided that the Government's case does 1'\ot 
rely on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative 
acts. A legislative act has consistently been defined as 
an act generally done in Congress in relation to the 
business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause 
only prohibits inquiry into those things generally said or 
done in the House in the performance of official duties 
and the motivation for those acts. 
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Con-
gress engage in many activities other than the purely 
legislative activities protected by the Speech and De-
bate Clause. These include a wide range of legiti-
mate "errands" performed for constituents, the making 
of appointments with government agencies, assistance in 
securing government contracts, preparing so-called "news 
letters" to constituents, ne,Ys releases. speeches delivered 
outside the Congress. The range of these related activi-
ties has grown over the years. They are performed in 
part because they have come to be expected by con-
stituents and because they arc a means of developing 
continuing support for future elections. Although these 
are entirely legitimate activities, they are political in 
nature rather than legislative, in the sense that term has 
been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has never 
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been seriously contended that these political 1natters, 
ho,vever appropriate, have the protection afforded by the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Careful examination of the 
decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the pro-
tection as reaching only those things "generally done in a 
session of the House by one of its members in relation 
to the business before it," 103 U. S., at 204, or things 
"said or done by hi1n as a representative, in the exer-
cise of the functions of that office." 4 Mass., at 27 
(quoted with approval in 341 U. S., at 373-374, and 
103 U. S., at 203). 
(b) Appellee argues, however, that in Johnson we ex-
pressed a broader test for the coverage of the Speech or 
Debate Clause. It is urged that we held that the Clause 
protected from Executive or Judicial inquiry all conduct 
"related to the due functioning of the legislative proc-
ess." It is true that the quoted words appear in the 
Johnson opinion, but appellee takes them out of con-
text; in context they reflect a quite different meaning 
from that now urged. Although the indictment against 
Johnson contained eight counts, only one count was 
challenged before this Court as in violation of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. The other seven counts concerned 
Johnson's attempts to influence members of the Justice 
Department to dismiss pending prosecutions. In ex-
plaining why those counts were not before the Court, 
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote: 
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it 
could be successfully contended, that the Speech or 
Debate Clause reaches conduct, such as was in-
volved in the attempt to influence the Department 
of Justice, that i in no wise related to the :due 
functioning of the legislative process. It is the 
application of this broad conspiracy statute to an 
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improperly motivated speech that raises the con-
stitutional problem with which we deal" 383 U. 8., 
at 172. (Emphasis added.) 
In stating that those things "in no wise related to 
the due functioning of the legislative process" were not 
covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense 
imply that everything that "related" to the office of a 
member was shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary, 
in Johnson we held, citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, that 
only acts generally done in the course of the process 
of enacting legislation were protected. 
Nor can we give Kilbourn a more expansive inter-
pretation. In citing with approval the language of 
Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808), 
the Kilbourn Court gave no thought to enlarging "legis-
lative acts" to include illicit conduct outside the House. 
The Coffin language is: 
"[T]he [Massachusetts legislative privilege] ought 
not to be construed strictly, but liberally that the 
full design of it may be answered. I will not con-
fine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, 
or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to the 
giving of a vote, to the making of a written re-
port, and to every other act resulting from the 
nature and in the execution of the office. And I 
would define the article as securing to every mern-
ber exemption from prosecution for everything said 
or done by him as a re]Jresentative, in the exercise 
of the functions of that office, without enquiring 
whether the exercise was regular according to the 
rules of the House, or irregular and against their 
rules. I do not confine tho member to his place 
in the House; and I am sa.tisfied that there are 
cases in which he is entitled to this privilege when 
14 
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not within the walls of the representatives' cham-
ber." !d., at 27 (emphasis added). 
It is suggested that in citing these words, which were 
also quoted with approval in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 
U. S. 367, 373-374 (1051), the Court \vas interpreting 
the sweep of the Speech or Debate Clause to be broader 
than Johnson seemed to indicate or than "·e today hold. 
Emphasis is placed on the statement that "there are 
cases in which [a member] is entitled to this privilege 
when not within the walls of the representatives' cham-
ber." But the context of Coffin v. Coffin indicates that 
in this passage Chief Justice Parsons was referring only 
to legislative acts, such as committee meetings, which 
take place outside the physical confines of the legislative 
chamber. In another passage, the meaning is clarified: 
"If a member ... be out of the chamber, sitting in 
conunittee, executing tho commission of the House, 
it appears to me that such member is \vithin the 
reason of the article aud ought to be considered 
\Yithin tho privilege. The body of which he is a 
member is in session, and he, as a member of that 
body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office. 
Hr ought, therefore, to be protected from civil or 
criminal prosecutions for everything said or clonr 
by him in the exercise of his functions as a rC'pre-
sentativo in committee, either in debating, in as-
senting to, or in draughting a report." s 4 Mal's., 
at 28. 
li'lttis ;;hils t9offiH GXjJIESSGtl ,£ tolti&Iiet fe£ eielstien of 
Uu! e·ulos gf *be h~iahn*llt o i!L 01 8 iH no 1ii nt d teln9!? a a 
:iP iMmnrity io 1 01 im w lsy Me:: ibu s. 
s It is e~prrinll~· important to notr thnt in Coffin v. Coffin , thr rourt· 
roncluclrd thnt thr clcfrndant was not rxrruting the dutirs of hi~ 
office whm he nllrgrclly defamed lhr plaint iff nncl was hence not 
rntitlcd to the clnim of priYilegr. 
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In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as 
protecting all conduct 1·elating to the legislative process. 
In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech 
or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was 
clearly a part of the legislative process-the due func-
tioning of the process. • Appellee's contention for a 
broaded interpretation of the privilege draws essentially 
on the flavor of the rhetoric and the sweep of the lan-
guage used by courts, not on the precise words Ul'cd in 
any prior case, and surely not on the sense of those 
cases, fairly read. 
(c) We \Yould not think it sound or wise, simply out 
of an abundance of caution to doubly insure legislative in-
dependence, to extend the privilege beyond its in tended 
scope, its literal language, aud its history. to incluclr all 
things in any way related to the legislative process. 
Given such a sweeping reading, we have no doubt that 
there are few activities in which a legislator engages that 
he would be unable somehow to "relate" to the legisla-
tive process. Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause 
must be read broadly to effectuate its purpose of pro-
tecting the independence of the Legislative branch, but 
no more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to 
make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from 
criminal responsibility. In its narrowest scopr, the 
0 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. R. lGR (1RL 1) (Yoting for a 
rr~olutioll); 'l'eii?U'?f v. Btandehm•e. 341 1i. S. 307 (19:il) (hara~~­
mcnt of witnrR~ b~· s t:~ tc !rgi~lator during n lcgi~JntiYc he:uing; not :1 
Speech or Drbntr Cl:nt~e ca~e); United StatPs v. Johnson, 3R3 U. S. 
1G9 (19GG) (subpoenaing ncord~ for romittee hearing); Dombrowski 
Y . .Eastland, 3R7 U. S. 82 (19()7) (~nbpornning rrcord~ for !'Orn-
mittee hearing); Pou·ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 48G (19G9) (voting-
for a resolution) . 
In Coffin Y. Coffin, 4 l\f~tss . 1 (lROS) , 1hr stnte equindent of the 
Speech or Debate' Clause wn~ hrlcl to be inapplicnhle to a legislator 
who was acting outsiclr of hi~ officinl clut ies. 
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Clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege. 
It has enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy 
others 'vith impunity, but that was conscious choice of 
the Framers awl t 1 •1 i 3 its hishnie nun jt bs s : ert+ 
as teell.lo 
The history of legislative privilege is by no means 
free from grave abuses by legislators. In one instance, 
abuses reached such a level in England that Parliament 
\\"aS compelled to enact curative legislation. 
"The practice of granting the privilege of freC'dom 
from arrest and molestation to members' servants 
in time became a serious menace to individual lib-
erty and to public order, and a form of protection 
by which offenders often tried- and they were often 
successful-to escape the penalties which their of-
fenses deserved, and ·which the ordinary courts would 
not have hesitated to inflict. Indeed the sale of 
'protections' at one time proved a source of income 
to unscrupulous members and· those 'parliamentary 
indulgences' \vere on several occasions obtainable 
at a fixed market price." C. Wittke, The History 
of English Parliamentary Privilege, 39 (1921). 
The authors of our Constitution were well aware of 
the history of both the need for the privilege and the 
abuses that could flow from too sweeping safeguards. 
In order to preserve other values, they wrote the priv-
ilege so that it tolerates and protects behavior on the 
10 "To this construction of the tuticle it is objected, that a pri,·ate 
citizen may have hi~ charader ba ~ely defamed, without any pecuniary 
recompense or sat isfaction. Thr truth of the objection is ad-
mitted. . . . The injury to the re]1utation of a pri,·atc citizen is 
of less importance to the commonwralth, than the free and un-
reserved exercise of the duties of n reprr~entati,·e, unawed by fear 
of legal prosecutions." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 32 (1808). 
Sec Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F. 2d 783 (CADC), cert. denied, 282 
U. S. 874 (1930) (defmnatory words uttered on Senate floor could 
not be basis of slander action). 
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part of Members not tolerated and protected when done· 
by other citizens, but the shield does not extend beyond 
what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legis-
lative process. Moreover, unlike England vvith no· 
formal, written constitutional limitations on the mon-
arch, we defined limits on each branch and provided 
other checks to protect against abuses of the kind ex-
perienced in that country. 
It is also suggested that even if we interpreted the 
Clause broadly so as to exempt from inquiry all matters 
having any relationship to the legislative process, mis-
conduct of Members would not necessarily go unpunished 
because each House is empowered to discipline its Mem-
bers. Article I, § 5, does indeed empower each House to 
"determine the rules of its Proceedings, pu11ish its Mem-
bers for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 
two thirds, expel a Member," but Congress is ill-equipped 
to investigate, try, and punish its Members for a wide 
range of behavior that is lQosely and incidentally related 
to tho legislative process.11 Indeed, Congress has shov,·n 
little inclination in this area.12 Moreover, if Congress 
11 In this sense the English analogy is inapt. Parliament is itself 
"The High Court of Par1Jam0nt "-the high0st court in the land-
nnd its judicial tradition better equips it for judicial tasks. "It is 
by no means an exaggeration to say that [the judicial characteristics 
of Parliament] colored and influenced some of the great struggles 
over lqd~ lat ive privilege in and out of Parliament to the very close 
of the nineteenth century. It is not altogether certain whether they 
h:we bern entirely forgotten even now. Nowhere has the theory that 
Parliamrnt is a court-the highest court of the realm, often acting 
in a judicial capacity and iu a judicial manner-persisted longer than 
in the history of privilege of Parliament." C. Wittke, The History 
of English Parliamentary Privilege, 14 (1921). 
12 Sec Thomas, Freedom of Debate: Protector of the People or 
Haven for the Criminal'?, 3 Han·. L. Hr,·. 77, SO-tG (::-io. :~ , 10(i5); 
Note, TIJc Bribed Congressmnn's Imunity from Prosecution, 75 
Yale L. J. 3:35, 349 n. 84 (1965); Oppenhrim, Congressional Free· 
Speech, 8 Loyola L. Hev. 1, 27-28 (1955-1956). 
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did lay aside its normal activities and take on itself 
the responsibility to police the myriad activities of its 
Members related to but not directly a part of the legis-
lative function, the independence of individual Members 
might actually be impaired. 
The process of disciplining a Member in the Con-
gress is not without countervailing risks of abuse since 
it is not surrounded with the panoply of protective 
shields that are present in a criminal case. An 
accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated 
standards 1 3 and is at the mercy of an almost un-
bridled discretion of the charging body that functions 
at once as accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury from 
whose decision there is no established right of review. 
It would be somewhat naive to assume that the triers 
would be wholly objective and free from considerations 
of party and politics and the passions of the moment.14 
Strong arguments can be made that trials conducted 
in a Congress with an entrenched majority from one 
political party could result in far greater harassment 
than a conventiollal criminal trial with the wide range 
of procedural protections for the accused, including in-
dictment by grand jury, trial by jury under strict stand-
ards of proof with fixed rules of evidence. and extensive 
appellate review. 
Finally, the jurisdiction of Congress to punish its 
Members is not all-embracing. For instance. it is un-
clear to what extent Congress would have jurisdiction 
over a case such as this in which the alleged illegal 
activity occurred outside the chamber, while the appellC'e 
'" f'rP. e.(!., In re Chapman. 106 F. 8. 661, GG9-fi70 (l~!.Ji): 
"The right to expel extend~ to all cases wlwre the offense:' is such 
as in the judgment of the Senate is imon~i~tcnt with the trust and 
duly of a member." 
14 Sec the arrount of the impeachment of PrP-<idrnt Audrf'w 
.Johnson in J. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage, 126-151 (1956). 
1 " "Engli.~h Parliaments h::l\-e historically re~en·rd to thrm,<·h·e/3-
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was a :Member, but was undiscovered or not brought 
before a grand jury until after he left office.~ ~· 
The sweeping claims of appellee would render Mem-
bers of Congress virtually immune from a wide range 
of crimes simply because the acts in question were 
peripherally related to their office. Such claims arc in-
consistent with the reading this Court has given, not 
only to the Speech or Debate Clause, but also to the 
other legislative privileges embodied in Art. I, § 6. The 
same sentence in which the Speech or Debate Clause 
appears provides that Members "shall in all Cases, ex-
cept Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be priv-
ileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session 
of their Perspective Houses. . . ." In Williamson v. 
United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908), this Court rejected 
a claim, made by a Member convicted of subornation of 
perjury in proceedings for the purchase of public lands, 
that he could not be arrested, convicted or imprisoned 
for any crime that was not treason, felony, or breach 
of the peace in the modern sense, i. e., disturbing the 
peace. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, in 
the 1007 Term, noted that in the 18th Century the term 
"Breach of the Peace" referred to breaching the King's 
peace and thus embraced the whole ranp:c of crimes at 
common law. Quoting Lord Mansfield's remarks in 
King Y. Wilkes, 2 Wils. 151, he noted, with respect to 
the claim of parliamentary privilege, "The la\YS of this 
country allow no place or employment as a sanctuary 
for crime .... " I d., at 439. 
and still retain thr sole and exclu~ivc right to punish their member:> 
for the acceptance of a bribe in the discharge of their office. No 
member of Pn.rlinmcnt mn.y be trird for such an offense in any court 
of the land." Cella, The Doctrine of Legi~lative PriYilege of Free-
dom of Sperch and Debntc: Its Past , Pre~ent and Future us a Bar 
to Criminal ProsecutionH in the Courts , 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 1, 14-15 
(1908). That this is obviously not the case in this country is im-
plicit in the remand of Representative .Johu~oll to be retried ou 
bribery charges. 
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The subsequent case of Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76 
( 1934), held that a Member's immunity from arrest 
in civil cases did not extend to civil process. Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis wrote for the Court: 
"Clause 1 [of Article I, § 6] defines the extent of 
the immunity. Its language is exact and leaves no 
room for construction which would extend the priv-
ilege beyond the terms of the grant." I d., at 82. 
We recognize that the privilege against arrest is not 
identical with the Speech or Debate privilege, but it 
is closely related in purpose and origin. It can hardly 
be thought that the Speech or Debate Clause protects 
what the sentence preceding it has plainly left open to 
prosecution, i. e., all criminal acts. 
(d) It, is, nevertheless, asserted that permitting the 
Executive to initiate the prosecution of a Member of Con-
gress for the specific crime of bribery is subject to serious 
potential abuse that might endanger the independence 
of the legislatiure-for example, a campaign contribution 
might be twisted by a ruthless prosecutor into a bribery 
indictment. But, as we have just noted, the Executive 
is not alone in possessing power potentially subject to 
abuse; such possibilities are inherent in a system of 
government which delegates to each of the three branches 
separate and independent powers.10 In the Federalist 
16 The potential for harassment by an unscrupulous member of 
the Executive Branch may exi~t, but this country has no tradition 
of absolute congressional immunity from criminal prosecution. See 
United States v. Quinn, 141 F. Supp. 622 (SDNY 1956) (motion for 
acquittal granted because the defendant Member of Congress was 
unaware of receipt of fees by his law finn); Burton v. United States,. 
202 U. S. 344 (1906) (Semtor convicted for accepting compensation 
to intervene before Post Office Department); United States v. Die-
trich, 126 F. 676 (CCD Neh. 1904) (Senator-elect's accepting pay-
ment to procure office for another not covered by statute); May v. 
United States, 175 F. 2d 994 (CADC 1949) (Congressman convicted 
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No. 73, Hamilton expressed concern over the possible· 
hazards that confronted an Executive dependent on Con-
gress for financial support. 
"The legislature, with a discretionary power over 
the salary and emoluments of the chief magistrate, 
could render him as obsequious to their will as 
they might think proper to make him. They might, 
in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or 
tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion, 
his judgment to their inclinations." 
Yet Hamilton's "parade of horribles" finds little real 
support in history. The check-and-balance mechanism, 
buttressed by unfettered debate in an open society with 
a free press has not encouraged abuses of power or toler-
ated them long when they arose. This may be explained 
of receiving compensation for services before an agency); United· 
States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955) (Congressman convicted 
of defrauding government agency). Bmmblett concerned a Con-
grcssmnn's misuse of office funds via a "kick-back" scheme, which 
is surely "related" to the legislative offire. 
A strategically timed indictment could indeed cause serious harm 
to a Congressman. Representative Johnson, for example, was in-
dicted while campaigning for re-election, and arguably his indict-
ment contributed to his defeat. On the other hand, there is the 
classic case of Mayor Curley who was re-elected while under in-
dictment. Sec 4 New Catholic Encyclopedia, at 541 (1967). More-
over, we should not overlook the barriers a prosecutor, attempting 
to bring such a case, mu."t face. First, he must persuade a grand 
jury to indict, and we arc not prepared to assume i.hat grnnd juries 
will act against a Member without solid evidence. Thereafter, he 
must convince a petit jury beyond a reasonable doubt with the pre-
sumption of innocence favoring the accused. A prosecutor who fails 
to clear one of these hurdles fares serious practical consequences 
when the defendant is a Congressman. The Legislative Branch is 
not without weapons of its own and would no doubt use them if it 
thought the ExccutiYc were unjustly harnssing one of its members .. 
Perhaps more imJiOr!ant is the omnipresence of the news media 
whose traditional function and competitive inclination affords no . 
immunities to reckless or irresponsible official misconduct. 
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in part because the third branch has intervened with 
neutral authority. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 
328 U.S. 303 (1946). The system of divided powers was 
expressly designed to check the abuses England experi-
enced in the 16th to the 18th century. 
Probably of more importance is the public opposition 
engendered by any attempt of one branch to dominate 
or harass another. Even lawful political attempts to 
establish dominance have met with little success owing 
to contrary popular sentiment. Attempts to "purge" 
uncooperative legislators, for example, have not been 
notably successful. We are not cited to any cases 
in which the bribery statutes, which have been appli-
cable to Members of Cougress for over 100 years,17 
have been abused by the Executive Branch. When a 
powerful Executive sought to make the Judicial Branch 
more responsive to the combined will of the Executive 
and Legislative Branches, it "·as the Congress itself that 
checked the effort to enlarge the Court. 2 M. Pusey, 
Charles Evans Hughes, c. 70 (1951). 
Io!t Joleasun, Mi6 eom c ;;pecifieally lu"l18 n~lit impi11iilil 
ir&t8 " Oengtcssman's ccUll!taph to idhm11ec m:otlter 
l!stt'IIBelt of the e:tocmmmllt ::eiS not ptoltilsihrl lir tM.~t 
ipi!I!!!S ill ];lghete Qlanse. We would be closing our 
eyes to the realities of the American political system if ~/M'n- tJn •. :Ad~ 
we failed to acknowledge that ~;(a'ctivities arc an · (J ~ • 
established and acce]1tecl part of the role of a Member, 
and are indeed "related" to the legislative process. If 
the Executive may prosecute a Member's attempt as in 
.! ohnson, to influence another branch of the Government 
in return for a bribe, its power to harass is not greatly 
enhanced if it can prosecute for a promise relating to a 
legislative act in return for a bribe. We therefore sec no 
17 The firsL bribery ~tatutr npplicablc to Congressmrn was enacted 
in 1853. Act of Feb. 2G, 1853, c. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171. 
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substantial increase in the power of tho Executive and 
Judicial Branches over tho Legislative Branch resulting 
from our holding today. If we underestimate the po-
tential for harassment, the Congress, of course, is free 
to exempt its Members from the ambit of federal bribery 
laws, but it has deliberately allowed the instant statute 
to remain on tho books for over a century. 
We do not discount on tirely the possibility that 
an abuse might occur, but this possibility which '"e 
consider remote, must be balanced against the po-
tential danger flowing from either the absence of a 
bribery statuto applicable to Members of Congrcf's or 
a holding that tho statuto violates the Constitution. 
As ,,.e noted at the outset, the purpose of the Speech 
or Dcba.tc Clause is to protect the in eli vidual legislator, 
not. simply for his O\Vn sake, but to prcf'erve the inde-
pendence and thereby tho integrity of the legislative 
process. But financial abuses, by way of bribes, as well 
as Executive power, can undermine legislative integrity 
and defeat the right of the public to honest representa-
tion.18 Depriving the Executive of the power to inves-
tigate and prosecute and tho Judiciary of the power to . ~ 
punish bribery of Members of Congress is unlikely to Moo ...f2/orl~  
Mlt in & 1 ot ia u oa:sc of indepemleiiC lcglslcttbl s :: ho eleeiek ~. 
M:tes ,,u tb · ni11e; atltet tlm11 fm p~. Given the dis-
inclination and disability of each House to police these 
matters, it is understandable that both Houses deliber-
ately delegated this function to tho courts, as they did 
with the power to punish persons committing contempts 
of Congress. 2 U. S. C. ~ 192 . 
.-~'EM .. ,._,.) ~g,r Wo tlmefm e oo1 ohuio that tho Speech or Debate 
- ~rw · Clause protects against inquiry into acts which occur 
18 "Your rcprcsrntativr owes you, not hi~ induRtry only, but his 
judgment; and he brtrays in~tead of srrving you if he sacrifices it 
1o your opinion." Speerh of Edmund Burke to the Electors of 
Bri tol, No\·. 3, 1774. 
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in the regular course of the legislative process and into 
the motivation for those acts. So expressed, the priv-
ilege is broad enough to insure the historic independence 
of the Legislative Branch, so essential to our separation 
of powers, but narrow enough to guard against the 
excesses of those who would corrupt the process by 
corrupting its Members. We t.urn 11ext to determine 
whether the subject of this criminal inquiry is \Vithin 
the scope of the privilege. 
III 
An examination of the indictment brought against 
appellee and the statutes on which it is founded re-
veals that no inquiry into legislative acts or moti\'ation 
for legislative acts is necessary for the Government to· 
make out a prima facie case. Four of the five counts 
charge that appellee "corruptly asked, solicited, sought, 
accepted, received, and agreed to receive" money "in 
return for being influenced ... in respect to his action, 
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation, which 
might at any time be pending before him in his official 
capacity." This is said to be a violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 201 (c) ( 1), which provides that a Member who "cor-
ruptly a....'\ks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, re-
ceives, or agrees to receive anything of value ... in 
return for . . . being influenced in his performance of 
any official act" is guilty of an offense. 
The question is whether it is necessary to inquire into 
how appellee spoke, how he debated, how he voted, or 
anything he did in the chamber or in committee in order 
to make out a violation of this statute. The illegal con-
duct is taking or agreeing to take money for a promise 
to act in a certain way. There is no need for the Govern-
ment to show that appellee fulfilled the alleged illegal 
bargain; acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the 
statute, not performance of the illegal promise. 
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Taking a bribe is, obviously, not part of the legisla-
tive process or function; it is not a legislative act. Nor 
is inquiry into a legislative act or the motivation for a 
legislative act necessary to a prosecution under this 
statute or this indictment. When a bribe is taken, it 
does not matter whether the promise for which the 
bribe was given was for the performance of a legisla-
tive act or, as in Johnson, for use of a Congressman's 
influence with the Executive Branch. Nor does it mat-
ter if the Member defaults on his illegal bargain. To 
make a prima facie case under this indictment, the Gov-
ernment need not show any act of appellee subsequent 
to the corrupt promise for payment for it is taking the· 
bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a 
criminal act. If, for example, there were undisputed evi-
dence that a Member took a bribe in exchange for an 
agreement to vote for a given bill and if there were also 
undisputed evidence that he, in fact, voted against the 
bill, can it be thought that this alters the nature of the 
bribery or removes it from the area of wrongdoing the 
Congress sought to make a crime? We think not. 
Another count of the indictment against appellee al-
leges that he "asked, demanded, exacted, solicited, 
sought, accepted, received, and agreed to receive" money 
"for and because of official acts performed by him in 
respect to his action, vote, and decision on postage rate 
legislation which had been pending before him in his 
official capacity." This count is founded on 18 U. S. C. 
§ 201 (g), which provides that a Member of Congress 
who "asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, re-
ceives, or agrees to receive anything of value for him-
self or because of any official act performed or to be 
performed by him" is guilty of an offense. Although 
the indictment alleges actual performanre of an official 
act for which a bribe is given, .it is once again un-
necessary to inquire into the act or its motivation. To. 
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sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that appellee 
solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with 
knowledge that the donor was paying him compensa-
tion for an official act. Inquiry into t.hc legislative per-
formance itself is not necessary; evidence of the Mem-
ber's knowledge of the alleged briber's illict reasons for 
paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the 
JUry. 
It is asserted, however, that inquiry into the alleged 
bribe is inquiry into the motivation for a legislative act, 
and it is urged that this very inquiry " ·as condemned as 
impermissible in Johnson. That argument seems to us 
to misconstrue the concept of motivation for legislative 
acts. The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit 
inquiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some 
nexus to legislative functions. In Johnson, ''"e indicated 
that on remand, Johnson could be retried on the con-
spiracy to d(•fraud count-all relating to conduct out-
side the House-so long as evidence concerning his speech 
on the House floor was not admitted. The Court's 
·opinion plainly implies that had the Government chosen 
to retry Johnson on that count, he could not have ob-
tained immunity from prosecution by asserting that the 
matter being inquired into was related to the motiva-
tion for his House speech. 
The only reasonable reading of the Clause, consistent 
with its history and purpose, is that it docs not pro-
hibit inquiry into activities which are casually or acci-
clen tally related to legislative affairs but not a part of 
the legislative process itself, so long as there is no at-
tempt to prove a link with a legislative act. Under 
this indictment and these statutes no such proof is 
needed.19 
10 In rrvrr~ing the Di~trict Court':-; ruling that a 1\lcmbrr of Con-
grrss may not be con~titutionall~· trird for a Yiolation of the federal 
bribery statutes, we exprrss no Yirw~ on the qurstion left oprn in 
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We hold that under this statute and this indictment, 
prosecution of appellee is not prohibited by the Speech 
or Debate Clause. Accordingly the judgment of the 
District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Johnson as to the constitutionality of an inquiry that probes into 
ll'gislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts if Congress 
specifically authorizes such in a narrowly drawn statute. Should 
such an inqury be made and should a conviction be sustained, then 
we would face the question whether inquiry into legislative acts and 
motivation is permissible under such a narrowly drawn statute. 
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